

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT**ROUTING SLIP**

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR		X		
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI		X		
6	DDA				
7	DDO		X		
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC		X		
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/OLL		X		
14	D/PAO				
15	D/PERS				
16	VC/NIC		X		
17	NIO/LA		X		
18	C/CATF/DO		X		
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SUSPENSE _____
Date

Remarks

Executive Secretary

12 Feb 86

Date

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Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

February 5, 1986

George P. Shultz
Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Secretary:

We understand that the Administration will be asking Congress for substantially increased military as well as humanitarian aid for the freedom fighters in Nicaragua.

You and your staff should know that a serious effort to systematically develop a majority that is willing to permit, if not approve, the Administration to support freedom fighters around the world is a multi-month operation and cannot be "ginned up" in 30 days. It also will require two or three televised Presidential addresses to the nation within the framework of a larger systematic effort carried out by your allies in the House and Senate. This effort must be reinforced by all of the Cabinet officers who deal with foreign policy and defense issues.

The attached newsletter on Nicaragua is a small example of the kind of systematic effort which your allies could be engaged in if they had leadership from the executive branch.

The failure of the State Department to develop a clear and coherent rationale for American policies against the Soviet empire makes it very likely that you will lose a vote in the House at the present time. Because the American people are, in the end, both moralistic and desirous of being in a legally defensible position, they do not understand the complexities of the individual case-by-case analysis which distinguishes between Cambodia, Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia and Nicaragua.

On the one hand the American people are told by the Secretary of State we should not help the anti-communist freedom fighters in Cambodia. They are also told we should not have overt aid to Savimbi and the freedom fighters in Angola. Then they are told we should actually be propping up the government of Ethiopia for humanitarian reasons. Finally they are told that we should offer covert aid to the freedom fighters in Nicaragua. Frankly, they don't understand the distinctions. There is no underlying rationale which explains in a coherent, diplomatic and legal framework what America's policies are.



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If there is truly a Soviet empire with all its Soviet colonial officers advising and managing it, using Cuban colonial troops to impose Soviet will, then a coherent rationale can be made. The President effectively advocated such an approach at the United Nations and in the State of the Union, which calls for a long-term American policy of aiding freedom fighters that will systematically drive back the Soviet empire in the Third World.

If this is the case, then weakening Cuban resolve and raising the cost to the Cubans of serving as Soviet colonial troops, becomes very important. At that point it becomes important to identify that the Nicaraguans are Communists and not Sandinistas, and similarly that the Angolan and Ethiopian governments are Communist, while the Afghan puppet regime is imposed by Soviet colonial troops, and the Cambodians are being oppressed by a Communist Vietnamese colonialism. In this analytic framework a coherent, systematic, legal and diplomatic doctrine can be developed.

Within a larger framework of our commitment to supporting freedom, Defense Department and Central Intelligence Agency systems could be established to maximize the effectiveness of pro-freedom, pro-Western guerrilla fighters. Our goal, as President Reagan has said, should be to enable freedom fighters to win and not merely survive. Within this strategy we could develop a coherent debate in the House of Representatives in the national news media and we could build public permission, if not public approval, for this kind of risk.

However, the State Department is a main stumbling block to the development of a coherent, long-term national policy in favor of freedom. The State Department's refusal to systematically describe the Nicaraguan government as Communists (something we have documented in the past and which remains true) and to lay out a rationale which is defensible legally, defensible in the United Nations, and which can be clearly articulated for the American people, undermines our entire effort. The State Department's refusal to link and develop a global strategy to deal with the Soviet empire in the Third World so the average person can understand the general framework of the Soviet empire, Soviet colonial officers and Soviet use of Cuban colonial troops, makes it impossible for us at the present time to sustain the kind of vote the President needs to implement the pro-freedom policy he called for at the United Nations and in his State of the Union address.

We strongly urge you, Mr. Secretary, to work with your allies in the House of Representatives to fundamentally change the behavior of the State Department bureaucracy by developing and articulating a clear, systematic and straight-forward position on this issue. The failure to do so, we think, virtually guarantees defeat of military aid for the Nicaraguan freedom fighters and makes it very difficult for us to sustain the policies which we believe in, you believe in, and the President

believes in, but which currently the bureaucracy you are in charge of is systematically undermining.

We look forward to working with you on the necessary reforms of the State Department.

Sincerely,


Newt Gingrich


Vin Weber


Duncan Hunter


Beau Boulter


Don Ritter

NG/jss
Enclosure

cc: Honorable Ronald Reagan
Honorable Donald Regan
Honorable Caspar Weinberger
✓ William Casey
Admiral John Poindexter
House Republican Leadership